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Reviewed by Peter Onuf
Christopher Tomlins’s important new book explores and illuminates 
a paradox, beginning with its title. Freedom, the central, self-defining 
characteristic in American national mythology, was bound to slavery and 
the dispossession of indigenous peoples by the very process of colonization 
itself. European settlers were not bound for freedom, to be liberated from the 
shackles of Old World tyranny and despotism in a free land. Far from being 
a terra nullius or empty space, the North American mainland was already 
possessed by natives. English colonizers deployed the “technology” of law to 
impose a new, European order on the American landscape and on the colonists 
themselves. Law furnished “the institutional capacities to establish migration 
and settlement overseas as legitimate, organized processes” (5). Neither law 
nor the land itself made settlers “free.” Instead, “freedom and unfreedom 
come together” in the process of colonization: they were “conditions of each 
other’s existence” (16). 
American historians have long since distanced themselves from the 
exceptionalism of Frederick Jackson Turner’s democratizing frontier, where 
free land gave rise to self-government, or of Louis Hartz’s notion that the 
English colonies, in the absence of the thick social relations and institutional 
infrastructure of the European old regime, were born liberal.1 By now, thanks to 
Edmund Morgan’s  American Slavery,  American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia,2 
it is well understood that freedom in colonial Virginia—and, by extension, 
British-America generally—was inextricably linked to the rise of racial slavery. 
Yet Morgan’s revisionist account of the new nation’s misbegotten birth and 
the neo-progressive historiography that it has since inspired still betrays 
strong exceptionalist tendencies. If slavery was the American revolutionaries’ 
legacy, so too was the freedom that they boldly claimed in the name of 
1. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since 
the Revolution (Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc. 1955). 
2. Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia 
(W.W. Norton 1975).
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their own natural rights—a freedom that ultimately could not be denied to 
subsequent claimants. Law-minded founders thus issued manifestoes—like 
the Declaration of Independence—and drafted constitutions and bills of 
rights that articulated an irresistible logic of liberty. Freedom and slavery may 
have shared a common genealogy, but they now clearly stood opposed to 
one another and this fundamental tension was reflected in the hypocritical 
professions of freedom-loving slave-owners. That tension provides much of 
the energy for contemporary historical writing on the belated, never quite 
realized fulfillment of American democracy’s promise. The law plays a critical 
freedom-making role in this redemptive meta-narrative. By bringing oppressed 
and excluded groups into its liberating embrace, the law overcomes its inertial, 
regressive tendencies to support vested interests and the powers that be. Law 
had created the “conditions of freedom” for enterprising white men, as legal 
historian James Willard Hurst famously wrote; as the rights of citizenship 
were extended to other groups, unfettered access to the law and its protections 
would extend the ambit of freedom.3
Tomlins, one of our very best legal historians, is less impressed with the 
immanently progressive tendencies of the law than most mainstream historians 
or many colleagues in his own field. This is not to say that he out-revises the 
revisionists, leaving us with a hopeless, irredeemable national narrative, but 
rather that he puts law in its place—that is, everywhere, as a “technology 
of and for colonizing” that explains practically everything in the extended 
era of Anglo-American colonization—without succumbing to romantic 
conceptions of the rule of law that animated Whiggish constitutionalists 
and their progressive progeny (506). Tomlins’s chronology is crucial, for the 
Revolution and the founding do not represent for him “a primal enactment of 
foundation in a moment of purity and human invention,” the birth or rebirth 
of “freedom,” only one—if by far the most important—of “an eternal succession 
of beginnings” (543). Tomlins instead looks forward to the abolition of slavery 
as the end of the great colonizing project that bound freedom to unfreedom 
and thus established a fundamental continuity between British America and 
the independent United States. After 250 years, Tomlins concludes, a “time 
for choice” had finally arrived, “and the instant was recognized, too, in all its 
gaunt and brilliant clarity.” In unleashing the force of the union against the 
Confederacy, Abraham Lincoln presided over a war that juxtaposed slavery to 
freedom: “if only for a moment, freedom was unbound” (569).
Tomlins does not mean to suggest that this “new birth of freedom” would 
shape the course of subsequent American history, for the postcolonial nation 
would reunite, consolidate and extend its governing capacity under the aegis 
of a reconstituted rule of law and a myth of constitutional continuity. Instead, 
3. Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United 
States (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1984).
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Lincoln could see—and we can see with him—that law was the problem, not 
the solution to the American dilemma of slavery and freedom. In his legal 
reasoning, Chief Justice Roger Taney was not wrong in Dred Scott v. Sandford 
(1857) when he remained faithful to what legal historian Mark Graber calls 
“constitutional bisectionalism” (522, citing Graber4). The American federal 
union, like the English and British colonies that preceded it, was a product 
of the law, not a temporizing compromise of its fundamental principles. 
Freedom and unfreedom had been conjoined by law in the colonizing project, 
“a conjunction that manned, planted, and secured the mainland for settler 
colonists, first against its existing inhabitants, later against the metropolitan 
imperial state” (524). This was the conjunction that the lawyer Lincoln 
sundered in a visionary moment, despite his fealty to the union and to the 
principles of compromise he imbibed from his idol Henry Clay. For freedom 
to be unbound, the law that had sustained slavery in North America for a 
quarter of a millennium had to be silenced. And so, “the war came,” and with 
it not only the destruction of the antebellum union but the end of the great 
epoch of Anglo-American colonizing.
Tomlins has a great deal to say to historians about the stories they tell. The 
most misleading one is the narrative that takes us from slavery to freedom, and 
that insists that the peculiar institution is an archaism, ultimately incompatible 
with capitalism or “liberal modernity” more generally. Yet it is striking that 
liberal modernity, as Tomlins writes, “actually coexists with innovations—
disciplined service, gendered subalternship, and racialized enslavement—that 
seem to contradict it” (343). “Seemed” is the critical word here, for modernity’s 
test for “modern” people is whether we see these “innovations” as incompatible 
with the way we see our world. But that does not tell us what “modern” people in 
the past—in their own present—could see as necessary, natural, and even moral, 
thus authorizing their own innovations. This larger point about anachronism 
has specific implications throughout Freedom Bound as Tomlins demonstrates 
the centrality of law to a colonizing process that was central to the making of 
the modern world. We need to overcome our own reflexive reverence for the 
law in order to grasp the way the law worked in and through this process. To 
help us do so, Tomlins resorts to insightful readings of literary works such as 
Shakespeare’s Tempest that enable us to see how law operates at the onset of 
colonization. Prospero reduces Caliban, his island’s original possessor, to a 
condition of servility: “[V]iolence begins law and completes it. As a modality 
of rule, of well ordering, law is extortion” (561). Taney and Prospero speak 
the same legal language: “Prospero’s seductive epilogue as clearly assures 
Caliban’s continued subalternship as Taney’s bisectional constitutionalism 
would guarantee the slaveholder’s indefinite veto” (569). The law would not 
destroy slavery, for the slave—like Caliban—was law’s creature.
Tomlins’s bold and eloquent indictment of law comes at the end of a very 
long book, and should be taken for its heuristic value, to shake us out of our 
4. Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2006).
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benumbed, law-bound complacency. Law, after all, is only a “technology,” not 
the incarnation of all that is evil in the world before or after Lincoln’s visionary 
moment, when freedom was unbound. And Tomlins is careful to avoid the 
reductive binary oppositions—slavery against freedom, Old World against 
New—that sustain conventional exceptionalist misreadings of the American 
past. It is crucially important that Tomlins does not begin his study, as I have 
done this review, with his discussion of Lincoln’s moment, when the essential 
meaning of colonization “flashed up in an instant” (569). If, at this moment of 
truth, law had to be jettisoned in a foundational “new birth of freedom,” law is 
all we have to work with when that moment passes and we return to work. So 
too, it was only through the operations of the law that Europeans could forge 
a “bridge that bore them across the ocean,” moving vast numbers of people 
“from one jurisdiction to another” and securing “permanent occupation” (69, 
77–78). Tomlins offers a comprehensive study of the way English America was 
peopled, under the aegis of the law, and how settlers—even in the Chesapeake—
enjoyed considerable freedom. If he deflates the Revolution and founding as 
critical nation-making moments in the land of the free, he also recognizes the 
ways colonization enabled colonists to enjoy unprecedented freedoms under a 
plurality of colonial legal regimes.
This essay cannot do justice to the richness of Tomlins’s analytical narrative. 
Suffice it to say, as the following discussion is intended to demonstrate, that 
Freedom Bound should—and I very much hope—will revolutionize the way we 
think about the history of American law and American history generally.
Tomlins begins with a comprehensive discussion of the great movement 
of people across the Atlantic, challenging the conventional view that this 
movement was largely coerced and involuntary. A first, rough calculation 
does indeed seem to suggest that “unfreedom” was the default: 320,000 (40 
percent) of 800,000 migrants during the colonial era were enslaved Africans 
(21 percent); another 54,500 (7 percent) were convicts or prisoners of war; 
and about half (48–50 percent) of the remaining, supposedly “voluntary” 
migrants “were committed to an initial period of servitude by indenture 
or similar arrangement” (35). The conventional conclusion would be that 
the unfree condition of more than 70 percent of migrants set the terms for 
labor: Unfreedom was the default. But Tomlins argues convincingly that the 
indentures that served to recruit and transport large numbers of laborers did 
not determine the character of work more generally. At any given time, and 
in stark and increasingly conspicuous comparison to their enslaved African 
counterparts, the large majority of European workers were free. Most white 
workers were contained within households, and most “unfree” servants—
particularly in New England and the middle colonies—were recruited into the 
family workforce to make up for temporary or permanent labor shortages. But 
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there were also significant numbers of detached workers, and their relative 
scarcity enabled them to command high wages and considerable autonomy 
under emerging colonial legal regimes.
Free labor was well established in law everywhere on the mainland, even 
in the Chesapeake where indentured servants were brutally exploited for the 
duration of their terms and the colonial “state” offered them few protections. 
Freedom, not unfreedom, was the default. The “supposition of a radical 
transformation” from unfreedom to freedom is therefore untenable, however 
much it resonates with the “discourse of progress that has animated modern 
American history and simultaneously distances modern America from its 
colonial origins” (30).
If “American identities, free and bound,” emerged out of the colonizing 
process itself, then the American Revolution could not be the “decisive point 
of transition from unfreedom to freedom” (65). That such a transition took 
place, with the Patriots turning their world upside down, is of course the 
nation’s foundational myth. Tomlins makes it clear that “freedom” antedated 
the break with Britain and that—despite grand rhetorical flourishes and a few 
modest local steps toward amelioration and emancipation—slavery flourished 
in the new nation. “In Anglo America,” he concludes, “modernity’s hopes 
and slavery’s brute facts come wrapped together as one” (409). In short, 
the expansive, dynamic, law-driven process of colonizing did not stop with 
American independence. To the contrary, as the expropriation of Indian 
country and the expansion of slavery on the cotton frontier would demonstrate, 
colonizing was about to enter its most dynamic phase.
Tomlins’s colonial period thus extends from 1580 to 1865. Colonizing began 
with the projection of legal claims in a competition of the European powers 
to establish sovereignty and dominion in the extra-European world. Tomlins 
shows how the law of nature and nations and the justifications it offered for 
making war on indigenous “sovereigns” were deployed in this competition, 
thus establishing the legal foundations of new American commonwealths.
Charters transformed claims into commonwealths. Just as his discussion 
of indentured servitude illuminates the legal technology of migration and 
therefore the broader narrative of American history, Tomlins’s brilliant reading 
of the colonial charters overturns the conventional wisdom. Usually seen as 
exercises in wishful thinking that were utterly inappropriate for new world 
conditions, these charters were in fact the founding documents of the Anglo-
American colonizing regime. By delegating sovereign authority and setting 
the limits of new colonies, charters simultaneously preempted European 
competitors and established “possession of territory to the exclusion of its 
[indigenous] inhabitants” (132, emphasis in the original). Under the forms 
of law, Indians were displaced “to the edges of conceptually emptied spaces” 
(177). 
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Charters “licensed departures” of migrants and “established jurisdictions 
to manage arrivals,” moving people and controlling labor in order to effect 
permanent occupation (77). Unlike the Spanish, the English had little interest 
in or capacity for managing and exploiting indigenous peoples—beyond 
early trafficking in Indian slaves—and instead created commonwealths 
“to be inhabited by one’s own migrants” (142). Charters were “catalogs of 
intense creative activity that emphasize systematic transformative action on 
the land” (159), providing the legal framework for migration, settlement, 
and development. “Manning, planting, and keeping were interdependent 
processes” requiring “long-term investment” (165). It is too often assumed 
that charters would prove irrelevant to the relatively autonomous legal and 
economic development of settlement societies. To the contrary, they provided 
the legal framework for ongoing negotiation and contestation both between 
imperial center and provincial periphery and within the new provinces 
themselves.
The charters’ “discourse of territorial appropriation, occupation, and 
improvement” was embraced everywhere in Anglo-America, most notably by 
settlers themselves (184). When, during the run-up to the Revolution, American 
patriots invoked their charters—even those, like Virginia’s, that had long been 
vacated or superseded—as “constitutions,” they reaffirmed their fealty to the 
fundamental principles of the empire’s colonizing regime. Indeed, it could be 
argued, colonists’ anxieties about how imperial reform efforts might restrain 
future colonization—by curbing land acquisition, protecting indigenous 
clients, and perhaps even by threatening planters’ property in slaves—drove 
them out of the British Empire. Imagining a postcolonial empire that would 
subvert their liberties and constitutional rights as colonizers, Anglo-Americans 
declared their independence in order to sustain colonization.
With the displacement of indigenous peoples, English colonizing became 
“more and more a self-colonization; no longer, that is, primarily a visitation of 
power upon strangers” (189). Through the “colonizing impulse,” a “plurality 
of representations of Englishness and plural modalities of rule” emerged on 
the North American mainland (188). Focusing on the sources and destinations 
of English migration, Tomlins illuminates the complexity of colonizing. 
“Poly-Olbion, not Albion”—a single, homogenous England—“was what went 
overseas to inhabit the colonies” (194). Settlers had experienced different 
forms of rule in different parts of England, from the domination of manor 
lordships in the arable South and Southwest to “weak manorialism” in pastoral 
regions (206), and would be subject to distinctive regimes in America. There 
was an elective affinity between specific regions in England and the colonies: 
“[S]elf-government…developed naturally in lordless environments.” If, at one 
extreme, “New England’s lordlessness was complete,” the “legal culture of 
the Chesapeake” imitated “downland arable England” with planters crudely 
mimicking their lordly counterparts (222, 224–25). In between, the middle 
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colonies combined characteristics of the two extremes: The Pennsylvania 
proprietary sought to impose a manorial regime, but settlers from pastoral 
areas and Quaker sectarians proved recalcitrant subjects.
Tomlins’s analysis of the “self-colonizing” process emphasizes the “variety 
of systems of work and labor regulation” that emerged from the “‘local 
contextualizing of legal processes’” (230, 228). On first reading, Tomlins’s 
survey of colonial legal regimes strikes familiar chords in the conventional 
interregional comparisons that dominate colonial history. His larger point, 
however, is that “local statutory regulation established interstitial zones of 
freedom in each region of colonial settlement” (294): Free labor was a creation 
of the law, even in pseudo-manorial Virginia. Free labor was neither the primal 
condition of free people in a state of nature, nor did it “arise in the course of 
a unidirectional eighteenth-century transformation of Anglo-American polis 
and society from rule by traditions of patriarchal magistracy to the rule of 
individuality and consent” (342). Freedom, in short, was a function of the 
colonizing process itself, not the natural state of man before history or at the 
endpoint of his progressive development through history.
By locating freedom in history and free labor in a plurality of colonizing 
regimes, Tomlins avoids the temptations of exceptionalism. “Freedom cannot 
be thought of as an absolute state” outside of history, “but as one subject 
to fundamental limit conditions, or liabilities, obedient to legal-cultural 
demarcations: age, gender, and race” (233). But even free white males exercised 
their “rights” under the law; their freedom was an historical construction, 
subject to the kinds of legal redefinitions that reduced free workers to 
“servants” in nineteenth-century labor law and “criminalized discipline in 
the employment relation” (349). Having banished the idea of freedom as an 
ahistorical absolute, Tomlins is not simply substituting a narrative of decline 
for the “rise of free labor” narrative. His point instead is that the notion of 
“consent” could be radically circumscribed in labor law even as its ambit 
expanded—albeit more in celebratory rhetoric than in practical reality—in the 
new nation’s civic and political life. If consent, like freedom, was a contingent 
historical-legal construction, the degradation of labor in master-servant law 
was certainly reversible.
Tomlins brilliantly deconstructs Henry Sumner Maine’s influential 
formulation that patriarchy—the legal and cultural foundation of the 
hierarchical old regime—gave way to a new, liberal politics based on consent, 
with a fundamental shift in law “from status to contract” (360, quoting Maine). 
Perhaps “the birth of liberal modernity” is better characterized as “a movement 
from lordship to consent,” with incipiently democratic notions of “equality” 
subverting traditional status distinctions and corporate identities in the 
political domain (361). Tomlins thus concedes that “‘status to contract’ is not 
a meaningless formulation,” but insists that its meanings were not universally 
equal. If freedom of contract shifted the balance of power to employers, the 
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extrication of patriarchy from polity reinforced patriarchal authority in the 
household. Hierarchy was ostensibly banished from public while “vertical and 
sexual divisions of labor” gave the domestic domain a “hierarchical structure…
which is male in authorship and ultimate benefit” (381). Though contract 
theorists anticipated Maine in positing a fundamental shift from patriarchy to 
consent—from a vertical to a horizontal conception of social order—historians 
of political thought have shown that “patriarchal and contractual accounts of 
association rose together,” not in sequence (362).
This displacement of patriarchal authority to a supposedly autonomous 
household in turn authorized a new “conception of the economic sphere’s 
autonomy,” now conceived as “private,” in contradistinction “to the polis’s 
‘public’ sphere” (381). Liberalism’s reconstruction undoubtedly expanded 
civic and political opportunity for white men, but their freedom was contingent 
and limited, notwithstanding the natural rights rhetoric that justified the break 
with Britain. Revolutionaries could delude themselves about the absoluteness 
and universality of their rights, deploying law as the liberating instrument 
of a free people. But their freedom was a product of law. “Both in England 
and on the American mainland, the English colonized barbarous others and 
simultaneously the rude parts of themselves,” and they would continue to do 
so after independence. “Coercive legalities disciplined contracts, patriarchy 
underpinned politics. The empire of the father shaped the empire the fathers 
founded” (398). If self-colonized Anglo-Americans made themselves “free” 
through law, and by resisting reforms in the imperial constitution, they also 
used law to enslave Africans.
Historians tend to juxtapose freedom and slavery, as if they had distinctive 
genealogies. The distinction enables modern Americans to distance themselves 
from the peculiar institution. If racial slavery and its legacies constitute the 
“American dilemma,” it is precisely because slavery was an archaic and alien 
institution, properly belonging to another time and place. In Tomlins’s 
words, “American historical orthodoxy has seized upon the social and 
political modernity colonizing made possible and has lashed it to an idealized 
temporality of progress that leaves…the premodern in its wake” (398). But 
slavery and freedom were inextricably linked: “[O]ne can think of the statute 
law of slavery precisely as an exercise in the employment of law as a technology 
of and for colonizing” (506).
For the colonizing powers, nature “sanctioned wars against barbarians 
and savages, criminals and beasts, and the punishment (enslavement) that 
accompanied such wars” (423). Beginning in the 1660s, settlers took matters 
into their own, whip-wielding hands, “fashioning slavery both as a culture 
of work and as a culture of absolute subjugation” (431). The development of 
these slave codes through innovative adaptations of the common law makes 
for dreary, dispiriting reading. Eighteenth-century legislators, sensitive to 
metropolitan critics and seeking to bolster their own self-esteem, dressed slavery 
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in the “garb of legality and humanity” (451). In doing so, they participated in 
“colonizing’s ‘civilizing process,’ its declaration of war on brutes” (507).
Tomlins’s comprehensive survey of colonial slave law sets the stage for his 
powerful concluding chapters, when the colonizing project that made America 
modern came to a bloody denouement in the Civil War, and freedom became 
unbound, if only for a brief, clarifying moment. The long epoch of North 
American colonizing has left us a tangled legacy that Christopher Tomlins’s 
magisterial Freedom Bound enables us to unravel.
